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Abstract
We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games
and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed
objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize
for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure
Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics.
For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation
ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation problems in large-scale scenarios such as networks often
cannot be solved as a single optimization problem. The size of the problem, the
distributed nature of information, or control preclude a centralized approach.
As a consequence, decisions are delegated to local actors or players. This gives
rise to strategic behavior as these players often have economic interests. Game
theory has studied the effect of such strategic interaction in various models of
resource allocation and scheduling. One of the most prominent ones is the class
of atomic congestion games [20], in which players allocate sets of resources.
The cost of a resource depends on the number of players allocating it. The
cost of a player is the sum of the costs of her allocated resources. The appeal
of this model stems not only from its applicability to prominent problems like
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scheduling, routing and load balancing, but also from desirable game theoretic
properties. Congestion games always possess pure Nash equilibria and the nat-
ural improvement dynamics converge to a pure Nash equilibrium since these
games are potential games. In fact, the class of congestion games is isomorphic
to the class of potential games [19], which shows their expressiveness. When
modeling network routing with congestion games and most of its variants like
weighted [11] or player-specific congestion games [18] one faces deficiency due
to the nature of the players’ cost functions. As a player’s cost is determined by
the sum of the resource costs, congestion games are not well suited to model
effects like bandwidth allocation, as here the cost of a player is determined only
by the bottleneck resource. Hence, Banner and Orda [4] introduced bottleneck
congestion games where the cost of a player is the maximum cost of her chosen
resources. Again, due to the nature of the cost functions, this class of games
and most of its variants [16, 14] only model the bottleneck effects and are unable
to describe latency effects. It is not difficult to envision scenarios in which both
effects, latency and bandwidth, are relevant to decision makers - especially in
today’s IT infrastructures where we find techniques with shared resources, for
example in the context of cloud computing or in software-defined networking.
Many users with lots of different applications and therefore different objectives
interact in one network and compete for the same resources. Consider, for ex-
ample, on the one hand media streaming and on the other hand video gaming.
In one application, bandwidth is the most important property, in the other it is
latency.
Therefore, we study a game theoretic model in which players may have hetero-
geneous objectives. We introduce the model of congestion games with mixed
objectives. In this model, resources have two types of costs, latency cost and
bottleneck cost, where the latter corresponds to the inverse of bandwidth. The
players’ costs may depend on both types of cost, where we allow different players
to have different preferences regarding the two cost types.
Our Contribution. We show that pure Nash equilibria exist and can be
computed in polynomial time in singleton games and in some matroid games.
However, we show that the matroid property alone is not sufficient for the ex-
istence. Additionally, it is necessary that either the players are only interested
in latency or bottleneck cost, or that the cost functions have a monotone de-
pendence. For the latter case, we show convergence of best-response dynamics
while the remaining cases are only weakly acyclic. For matroid games that do
not satisfy one of the additional properties, we show that pure equilibria might
not exist and it is even NP-hard to decide whether one exists. To overcome
these non-existence results, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria. For
several classes, we can show that there exist β-approximate pure Nash equilibria
where β depends on the size of the largest strategy.
Related Work. Milchtaich [18] studies the concept of player-specific conges-
tion games and shows that in the singleton case these games always admit pure
Nash equilibria. Ackermann et al. [1] generalize these results to matroid strat-
egy spaces and show that the result also holds for weighted congestion games.
Furthermore, they point out that in a natural sense the matroid property is
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maximal for the guaranteed existence of pure Nash equilibria in player-specific
and weighted congestion games. Moreover, Milchtaich [18] examines congestion
games in which players are both weighted and have player-specific cost func-
tions. By constructing a game with three players, he shows that these games
do not necessarily possess pure Nash equilibria, even in the case of singleton
strategies.
Mavronicalas et al. [17] study a special case of these games in which cost func-
tions are not entirely player-specific. Instead, the player-specific resource costs
are derived by combining the general resource cost function and a player-specific
constant via a specified operation (e. g. addition or multiplication). They show
that this restriction is sufficient to guarantee the existence of pure Nash equi-
libria in games with three players. Dunkel and Schulz [9] show that the decision
problem of whether a weighted network congestion game possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium is NP-hard. The equivalent result is achieved for player-specific
congestion games by Ackermann and Skopalik [3].
Banner and Orda [4] study the applicability of game-theoretic concepts in net-
work routing scenarios. In particular, they derive bounds on the price of an-
archy in network bottleneck congestion games with restricted cost functions
and show that a pure Nash equilibrium which is socially optimal always exists.
Cole et al. [8] further investigate the non-atomic case, they especially consider
the impacts of variable traffic rates. In contrast, Harks et al. [16] concentrate
on the atomic case and study the lexicographical improvement property, which
guarantees the existence of pure Nash equilibria through a potential function ar-
gument. They show that bottleneck congestion games fulfill this property and,
hence, they are potential games. Harks et al. [15] consider the complexity of
computing pure Nash equilibria and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion
games. Moreover, they show this property in matroid bottleneck congestion
games.
Chien and Sinclair [7] study the convergence towards approximate pure Nash
equilibria in symmetric congestion games. Skopalik and Vöcking [21] show inap-
proximability in asymmetric congestion games, which is complemented by ap-
proximation algorithms for linear and polynomial delay functions [5, 10], even
for weighted games [6]. Hansknecht et al. [13] use the concept of approximate
potential functions to examine of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games under different restrictions on the cost functions.
Preliminaries A congestion game with mixed objectives is defined by a tuple
Γ = (N,R, (Σi)i∈N , (αi)i∈N , (ℓr)r∈R , (er)r∈R), where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes
the set of players and R denotes the set of resources. For each player i let
Σi ⊆ 2R denote the strategy space of player i and αi ∈ [0, 1] the preference
value of player i. For each resource r let ℓr : N → R denote the non-decreasing
latency cost function associated to resource r, and let er : N → R denote
the non-decreasing bottleneck cost function associated to resource r. For a
state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Σ1 × . . . × Σn, we define for each resource r ∈ R by
nr(S) = |{i ∈ N | r ∈ Si}| the congestion of r. The latency cost of r in state
S is given by ℓr(S) = ℓr(nr(S)), and the bottleneck cost by er(S) = er(nr(S)).
The total cost of player i in state S depends on αi and is defined as ci(S) =
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αi ·
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S) + (1− αi) ·maxr∈Si er(S).
For a state S = (S1, ..., Si, ..., Sn), we denote by (S
′
i, S−i) the state that is
reached if player i plays strategy S′i while all other strategies remain unchanged.
A state S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is called a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) if for all
i ∈ N and all S′i ∈ Σi it holds that ci(S) ≤ ci(S′i, S−i) and a β-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium for a β ≥ 1, if for all i ∈ N and all S′i ∈ Σi it holds that
ci(S) ≤ β · ci(S′i, S−i).
A singleton congestion game with mixed objectives is a congestion game with
mixed objectives Γ with the additional restriction that all strategies are sin-
gletons, i. e., for all i ∈ N and all Si ∈ Σi we have that |Si| = 1. A matroid
congestion game with mixed objectives is a congestion game with mixed objec-
tives in which the strategy spaces of all players form the bases of a matroid
on the set of resources. We say that the cost functions of a congestion game
with mixed objectives have a monotone dependence if there is a monotone non-
decreasing function f : R→ R, such that er(x) = f(ℓr(x)) for all r ∈ R. We call
the players α-uniform if there is an α ∈ [0, 1] such that αi = α for all players
i ∈ N . We say the players have pure preferences if αi ∈ {0, 1} for all players
i ∈ N .
2 Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria
Congestion games with mixed objectives are more expressive than standard or
bottleneck congestion games. Consequently, the existence of pure Nash equilib-
ria is guaranteed only for special cases. Unlike, e. g., player-specific congestion
games, the matroid property is not sufficient for the existence of PNE. We show
that we have the existence of PNE in singleton games or for matroid games
with players that have pure preferences or cost functions that have a monotone
dependence.
Theorem 1. A congestion game with mixed objectives Γ contains a pure Nash
equilibrium if Γ is a
1. singleton congestion game, or
2. matroid congestion game and the players have pure preferences, or
3. matroid congestion game and the cost functions have a monotone depen-
dence.
A pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We prove the theorem by reducing the existence problem of a pure Nash
equilibrium in a congestion game with mixed objectives to the existence problem
of a PNE in a congestion game with player-specific cost functions. The existence
of PNE is guaranteed in singleton [18] and matroid [1] player-specific congestion
games and polynomial time complexity immediately follows [2, 1].
We will utilize the following lemma which states that an optimal basis with
respect to sum costs is also optimal w. r. t. maximum costs.
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Lemma 2. Let M be a matroid, and let B = {b1, . . . , bm} be a basis of M
which minimizes the sum of the element costs. Then for any other basis B′ =
{b′1, . . . , b′m} it holds that max1≤i≤m bi ≤ max1≤i≤m b′i.
Lemma. Let B = {b1, . . . , bm} be an optimal basis, and assume by contradiction
that there is a different basis B′ = {b′1, . . . , b′m} with b′m < bm (w. l. o. g. assume
that bm and b
′
m are the most expensive resources in B and B
′, respectively).
Since B and B′ are both bases and bm /∈ B′, there is an element b′i ∈ B′ such
that B′′ = B\{bm}∪{b′i} is a basis ofM . By assumption we have b′i ≤ b′m < bm,
which implies that B′′ has a smaller total cost than B. Therefore, B cannot be
optimal, which gives a contradiction.
We now proceed to prove Theorem 1 and consider the three different cases:
1. The cost of player i in a state S with Si = {r} is ci(S) = αi · ℓr(S) +
(1− αi) · er(S). By defining the player-specific cost functions cir(x) =
αi · ℓr(x) + (1− αi) · er(x) for every i ∈ N and r ∈ R, we obtain an
equivalent singleton player-specific congestion game.
2. Using Lemma 2, we can treat all the players who strive to minimize their
bottleneck costs as if they were striving to minimize the sum of the bot-
tleneck costs of their resources. Hence, we can construct a player-specific
congestion game in which the player-specific cost functions correspond to
the latency functions for those players with preference value 1, and to the
bottleneck cost functions for those players with preference value 0.
3. A player i who allocates the resources {r1, . . . , rk}, where w. l. o. g. rk
is the most expensive one, in a state S, incurs a total cost of ci(S) =
αi ·
∑k
j=1 ℓrj(S)+(1− αi) ·erk(S) . Due to Lemma 2, we know that ℓrk(S)
is minimized if
∑k
j=1 ℓrj (S) is minimized. The monotonicity of f with
er(x) = f(ℓr(x)) implies that erk is also minimized. Observe that mono-
tonicity also ensures that rk is the bottleneck resource. Hence, a PNE of a
congestion game with cost functions ℓr for every r ∈ R is a PNE of Γ.
We show that the matroid property is not sufficient for the existence of PNE.
Even for linear cost functions and uniform players, there are games without
PNE.
Theorem 3. There is a matroid congestion game with mixed objectives Γ with
linear cost functions and α-uniform players which does not possess a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. We construct a two-player game with linear cost functions and αi = 0.5
for both players. The set of resources is R = {r1, . . . , r7}. The strategies
for player 1 are Σ1 = {{ri, rj , rk} | i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 6}} and the strategies for
player 2 are Σ2 = {{ri, rj} | i, j ∈ {4, . . . , 7}}. The latency and bottleneck cost
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functions for the first three resources are ℓr1(x) = ℓr2(x) = ℓr3(x) = 0 and
er1(x) = er2(x) = er3(x) = 200 · x, respectively. For resource r4 and r5 the cost
functions are ℓr4(x) = ℓr5(x) = 20 · x and er4(x) = er5(x) = 50 · x. For resource
r6 the cost functions are ℓr6(x) = 8 · x and er6(x) = 80 · x. For resource r7 the
cost functions are ℓr7(x) = 0 and er7(x) = 160 · x.
We note that for player 1 only the strategies S1,1 := {r1, r2, r3} and S1,2 :=
{r4, r5, r6} can be best-response strategies in any state, since {r1, r2, r3} strictly
dominates all remaining strategies. Hence, with respect to the existence of
pure Nash equilibria, we can restrict player 1 to these two strategies. In the
analogous way, we can restrict player 2 to the strategies S2,1 := {r4, r5} and
S2,2 := {r6, r7}. This yields a game with only four states and, as we can easily
verify, a best-response improvement step sequence starting from any of these
states runs in cycles:(
100 45
S1,1 S2,1
)
1−→
(
94 90
S1,2 S2,1
)
2−→
(
108 88
S1,2 S2,2
)
1−→
(
100 84
S1,1 S2,2
)
2−→
(
100 45
S1,1 S2,1
)
The numbers above the strategies give the costs of the respective player in the
described state, and the numbers on the arrows indicate which player changes
her strategy from one state to the next one.
Note that the nature of the existence proofs of Theorem 1 implies that a PNE
can be computed in polynomial time. However, if existence is not guaranteed,
the decision problem whether a matroid game has a pure Nash equilibrium is
NP-hard:
Theorem 4. It is NP-hard to decide whether a matroid congestion game with
mixed objectives possesses at least one pure Nash equilibrium even if the players
are α-uniform.
Proof. We reduce from Independent Set (IS), which is known to be NP-complete
[12]. Let the graph G = (V,E) and k ∈ N be an instance of IS. We construct
a matroid congestion game Γ that has a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if G
has an independent set of size at least k.
We begin by describing the structure of Γ. The game contains the following
groups of players:
• For each node v ∈ V , there is one player who can allocate all edges adjacent
to v, but has a profitable deviation to a special strategy if and only if a
player of a neighboring node allocates one of the adjacent edges.
• There are two players who play a game that is equivalent to the game in
the proof of Theorem 3 if an additional player allocates a certain resource
r7, but possesses a PNE otherwise.
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• Finally, there is one connection player for whom it is profitable to allocate
r7 if and only if at least n− k + 1 of the node players deviate from their
“edge strategy”.
Clearly, if we can achieve this dynamic, the existence of a PNE in Γ is
equivalent to the existence of an independent set in G. Let V = {v1, . . . , vn},
and for every vi ∈ V we denote by Evi = {e ∈ E | vi ∈ e} the set of edges
adjacent to vi, and by d(vi) = |Evi | the degree of vi in G. Let d = maxv∈V d(v)
be the maximum degree in G. We can assume that d ≥ 2.
We now give a formal definition of Γ = (N,R, (Σi)i∈N , (αi)i∈N , (ℓr)r∈R ,
(er)r∈R). The set of players is N = {v1, . . . , vn, c, 1, 2} and the set of resources
is R = {re | e ∈ E}∪{rji | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , d(vi)−1}}∪{rc, r1, . . . , r7}.
The strategies for the vertex players vi are all subsets of size d(vi) from a set con-
sisting of the adjacent edge resources, some alternative resources, and resource
rc: Σvi =
{
{X | X ⊆
(
{re | e ∈ Evi} ∪ {q1i , . . . , qd(vi)−1i , rc}
)
and |X | = d(vi)
}
.
Our choice of cost functions will ensure that in an equilibrium every vertex
player vi either allocates all resources re that belong to her adjacent edges
e ∈ Evi or the resources qi and rc. The two strategies of the connection player
are Σc = {{rc}, {r7}}. Finally, there are the players 1 and 2 with strategies
Σ1 = {{ri, rj , rk} | i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 6}} and,Σ2 = {{ri, rj} | i, j ∈ {4, . . . , 7}},
respectively.
The cost functions for the edge resources are ℓre(x) = 1000 ·x and ere(x) = 0
for all e ∈ E, for the alternative resources ℓ
q
j
i
(x) = 0 and e
q
j
i
(x) = 1000·d(vi)+1
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ d, and for the connection resource ℓrc(x) = 0 and
erc(x) = 0 for x ≤ n−k+1, erc(x) = 1000 for x > n−k+1. The cost functions
of the resources r1, . . . , r7 are ℓr1(x) = ℓr2(x) = ℓr3(x) = 0, er1(x) = er2(x) =
er3(x) = 200 · x, ℓr4(x) = ℓr5(x) = 20 · x, er4(x) = er5(x) = 50 · x, ℓr6(x) =
8 · x, er6(x) = 80 · x, ℓr7(x) = 0, er7(x) = 80 · x. We choose the value αi = 0.5
for all players.
It remains to show that this game has a pure Nash equilibrium if and only
if G has an independent set of size k. If there is an independent set, we can
construct an equilibrium as follows: Each node player that corresponds to a
node in the independent set chooses the strategy that contains all her edge
resources. Each remaining node player chooses a strategy that contains only
her q-resources and the resource rc. The connection player chooses resource rc.
Player 1 chooses {r1, r2, r3} and player 2 chooses {r6, r7}. It is easy to verify
that this is indeed a pure Nash equilibrium.
If there is no independent set of size at least k, we argue that in an equi-
librium there are more than n− k of the node players on resource rc. Observe
that for a node player that allocates at least one of the q-resources it is the best
response to allocate the remaining q-resources and the resource rc for no addi-
tional cost. Furthermore, if two node players allocate the same edge resource,
their best response is to choose the q-resources and rc. Hence, the best response
of the connection player is {r7} and players 1 and 2 will play the subgame
defined in Theorem 3 that does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
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In Theorem 1 we characterized restrictions on the preference values and
cost functions that guarantee the existence of PNE in congestion games with
mixed objectives, when combined with the matroid property of strategy spaces.
The following theorem shows that the matroid property is necessary even if we
impose the additional constraint that bottleneck and latency cost functions are
identical and linear.
Theorem 5. There exists a congestion game with mixed objectives with linear
cost functions ℓr = er for all resources r ∈ R, and either
1. pure preferences, or
2. α-uniform players
which does not possess a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We show the correctness of the statement by constructing two games
which fulfill the preconditions stated in the two cases of the theorem and which
do not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
1. We define the game with two players with α1 = 0 and α2 = 1. The game
has six resources R = {r1, r2, . . . , r6}. Each player has two strategies, thus
Σ1 = {{r1}, {r2, r3, r4, r5}} and Σ2 = {{r2, r3, r4}, {r5, r6}}. The latency
and bottleneck costs are given by ℓr1(x) = 6 ·x, ℓr2(x) = ℓr3(x) = ℓr4(x) =
2 ·x, ℓr5(x) = 4 ·x, ℓr6(x) = 3 ·x with er(x) = ℓr(x) for all r ∈ RWe utilize
the fact that bottleneck players prefer to allocate many cheap resources,
while players who are interested in latency are more willing to share a
single expensive resource.
Let S1,1 and S1,2 denote the strategies of player 1, and S2,1 and S2,2 the
strategies of player 2. Then we have the following cycle of improvement
steps which visits all four states:
(
6 6
S1,1 S2,1
)
1−→
(
4 12
S1,2 S2,1
)
2−→
(
8 11
S1,2 S2,2
)
1−→
(
6 7
S1,1 S2,2
)
2−→
(
6 6
S1,1 S2,1
)
The numbers above the strategies give the cost of the respective player in
the associated state, and the numbers on the arrows indicate which player
has to change her strategy in order to get to the next state. As we see,
every change in strategy decreases the cost of the player performing it.
Hence, none of the four states is a pure Nash equilibrium.
2. We prove the theorem for the example α = 0.5. However, it is easily
generalizable to arbitrary values between 0 and 1. The idea is to con-
struct a game with two players in which one player always allocates an
expensive resource. In addition this, both players allocate two resources
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and share exactly one of these resources. In detail we have the resources
R = {r1, r2, . . . , r5} and the strategy sets Σ1 = {{r1, r2, r4}, {r1, r3, r5}}
and Σ2 = {{r2, r5}, {r3, r4}}. The latency and bottleneck costs are given
by ℓr1(x) = 32 · x, ℓr2(x) = ℓr3(x) = 14 · x and ℓr4(x) = ℓr5(x) = 12 · x+8
with er(x) = ℓr(x) for all r ∈ R. Depending on which resource is shared,
the players allocate either two resources with medium costs or one cheap
and one expensive resource, where the sum of the two resource costs is
slightly smaller in the latter case.
The second player prefers the first alternative, since she has to pay an
additional price for her most expensive resource. On the other hand, the
first player always allocates an expensive resource, hence she incurs no
additional costs when allocating a cheap and an expensive resource.
The strategy spaces are constructed in such a way that in every state
the players share exactly one of the resources {r2, . . . , r5}. Let S1 denote
a state in which r2 or r3 is shared, and S2 a state in which r4 or r5 is
shared. Then the players incur the following costs: c1(S1) = 56, c2(S1) =
38, c1(S2) = 55, c2(S2) = 39.
As we see, player 1 prefers the state S2, while player 2 prefers S1. Since
both players always have the possibility to deviate to the other state, there
is no state in which none of the players can improve her costs, and hence
Γ possesses no pure Nash equilibrium.
3 Convergence
In this section we investigate in which games convergence of best-response im-
provement sequences to a pure Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed. Perhaps
surprisingly, there are singleton games in which best-response improvement se-
quences may run in cycles. This is even true for games with pure preferences.
Theorem 6. There are singleton congestion games with mixed objectives and
pure preferences in which best-response improvement sequences may run in cy-
cles.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a singleton game with three play-
ers and showing that there exists a cyclic best-response improvement sequence
in certain states. The game consists of three resources R = {r1, r2, r3} and
the players have the strategy sets Σ1 = {{r1}, {r2}}, Σ2 = {{r1}, {r3}} and
Σ3 = {{r2}, {r3}}. Two players prefer the latency costs α1 = α2 = 1, one
the bottleneck costs α3 = 0. The latency and bottleneck costs are given by
ℓr1 = (2, 5), ℓr2 = (3, 4), ℓr3 = (1, 6) and er2 = (1, 4), er3 = (2, 3). The first
number in the cost functions gives the cost if the resource is used by one player,
the second number gives the cost if two players use it. The bottleneck cost
function of r1 is irrelevant since it is only used by players 1 and 2.
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In this game, the following cycling best-response improvement sequence can
occur (set braces omitted for better readability):
(
5 5 1
r1 r1 r2
)
1−→
(
4 2 4
r2 r1 r2
)
2−→
(
4 1 4
r2 r3 r2
)
3−→
(
3 6 3
r2 r3 r3
)
1−→
(
2 6 3
r1 r3 r3
)
2−→
(
5 5 2
r1 r1 r3
)
3−→
(
5 5 1
r1 r1 r2
)
The numbers on the arrows indicate which player has to change her strategy
in order to reach the next state. The variable ri denotes the resource which is
used by the corresponding player and the number on top gives the cost value
for this player. We can verify that each change in strategy is beneficial for the
player performing it (since every player has only two strategies, every improving
strategy is a best-response strategy).
Hence, we have a cycle of six states that are visited during this best-response
improvement sequence. The pure Nash equilibria (r1, r3, r2) and (r2, r1, r3) are
never reached.
Note that due to our reduction in the proof of Theorem 1, we know that
there exists a sequence that leads to an equilibrium [1].
Corollary 7.
1. Singleton congestion games with mixed objectives are weakly acyclic.
2. Matroid congestion games with mixed objectives that have pure preferences
are weakly acyclic.
We now turn to matroid games with a monotone dependence and show that
they converge quickly to a PNE if the players perform lazy best-response moves.
That is, if players perform a best response move, they choose the best-response
strategy that has as many resources in common with the previous strategy as
possible.
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a matroid congestion game with mixed objectives with
cost functions that have a monotone dependence. Then any sequence of lazy
best-response improvement steps starting from an arbitrary state in Γ converges
to a pure Nash equilibrium after a polynomial number of steps.
Proof. The proof idea is based on the proof by Ackermann et al. [2] which shows
that matroid congestion games guarantee polynomial convergence to PNE.
We consider an increasingly ordered enumeration of all latency values that can
occur in Γ (an enumeration of the values {ℓr(x) | r ∈ R, x ∈ N}). Let ℓ′r(x)
denote the position of the respective cost value in the enumeration.
We define the following variant of Rosenthal’s potential function: Φ(S) =∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 ℓ
′
r(i). If n = |N | denotes the number of players, and m = |R| the
number of resources in Γ, then there are at most n ·m different cost values in
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the game. Hence, the value of Φ is upper bounded by n2 ·m2. Thus, it suffices
to show that every lazy best-response improvement step decreases the value of
Φ by at least 1.
If a player replaces a single resource r by another resource r′ in a lazy best-
response with αi ·ℓr′(S′)+(1−αi) ·er′(S′) < αi ·ℓr(S)+(1−αi) ·er(S), then due
to the monotone dependence, we have ℓr′(S
′) < ℓr(S). Hence ℓr′(S
′) must occur
before ℓr(S) in the increasingly ordered enumeration of the cost values and we
have ℓ′r′(S
′) < ℓ′r(S). Thus, every sequence of lazy best-response improvement
steps in Γ terminates after a polynomial number of steps.
We remark that the only reason to restrict the players to lazy instead of
arbitrary best-response strategies is that the players may have a preference
value of exactly 0. If a player’s cost is determined solely by her most expensive
resource, she might be playing a best-response strategy by replacing her most
expensive resource by a cheaper one and additionally replace another resource
by a more expensive one. This additional exchange does not necessarily increase
her costs, but it could lead to an increase in the value of the potential function.
However, if all players have preference values different from 0, the theorem holds
for arbitrary best-response improvement steps.
4 Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
As PNE do not exist in general, we study the existence of approximate equilibria.
However, in general we cannot achieve an approximation factor better than 3.
Theorem 9. There is a congestion game with mixed objectives, in which all
cost functions are linear, that does not contain a β-approximate pure Nash equi-
librium for any β < 3.
Proof. We show the theorem by constructing a game with 10 players, in which
in every state there is at least one player who can improve her costs by a factor
of 3. A formal definition of the game is given by:
Γ = (N,R, (Σi)i∈N , (αi)i∈N , (ℓr)r∈R , (er)r∈R) with
N = {1, . . . , 10}, R = {ri1, ri2 | i ∈ N \ {5, 6}}∪
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{
ri,j1,1, r
i,j
1,2, r
i,j
2,1, r
i,j
2,2 | i < j and (i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} or i, j ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10})
}
,
Σi =
{
{ri1} ∪ {rj,k1,1, rj,k2,1 | j = i or k = i},
{ri2} ∪ {rj,k1,2, rj,k2,2 | j = i or k = i}
}
for all i ∈ N \ {5, 6}
Σ5 =
{
{r11, . . . , r41 , r71, . . . , r101 , ri,j1,2, rk,l1,2 | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, l ∈ {7, . . . , 10}
}
∪
{
{r12, . . . , r42 , r72, . . . , r102 , ri,j1,1, rk,l1,1 | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, l ∈ {7, . . . , 10}
}
Σ6 =
{
{r11, . . . , r41 , r72, . . . , r102 , ri,j2,2, rk,l2,1 | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, l ∈ {7, . . . , 10}
}
∪
{
{r12, . . . , r42 , r71, . . . , r101 , ri,j2,1, rk,l2,2 | i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, l ∈ {7, . . . , 10}
}
αi = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {5, 6} and αi = 0 for i ∈ {5, 6},
ℓr(x) = x and er(x) = 0 for all r ∈
{
rij | i ∈ N \ {5, 6}, j ∈ {1, 2}
}
,
ℓr(x) = 0 and er(x) = x for all r ∈
{
ri,jk,l | i, j ∈ N \ {5, 6}, k, l ∈ {1, 2}
}
The game contains three different groups of players and two different groups
of resources. Players 1 to 4 and 7 to 10 each have two personal resources ri1 and
ri2 among which they have to choose. These are the only resources on which
they incur costs.
In addition to these resources, there are two times two resources correspond-
ing to each set consisting of two players from the same group (either 1 to 4 or
7 to 10). The two resources represent the two strategies which are available to
these players, and exist distinctly for both players 5 and 6. If player i plays
her first strategy, then she also allocates all resources that correspond to sets in
which i is contained and represent the first strategy.
In every state, the players 5 and 6 allocate one of the personal resources rij
for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and i ∈ {7, . . . , 10}, where the j is the same for all
players among a group. Additionally, for both groups they have to allocate a
resource that corresponds to one pair of players and represents the j that they
are not using (e. g., if player 5 allocates resource ri1 for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , 4},
she must also allocate a resource that corresponds to a pair of players from
{1, . . . , 4} and represents strategy 2, and an analogous resource for the players
in {7, . . . , 10}).
These two additional resources are the ones on which players 5 and 6 incur
costs. Since they are interested in their bottleneck costs, their costs are equal
to the more expensive of the two.
We can analyze this game by considering an arbitrary state. The strategy
sets of players 5 and 6 are constructed in such a way that in every state they
allocate the same personal resources of all players in {1, . . . , 4} or {7, . . . , 10}.
W. l. o. g. assume that they both allocate the resources r11 , . . . , r
4
1 . This
implies that the players 1 to 4 have a cost of 3 if they use the first resource, and
a cost of 1 if they allocate their second resource. Hence, this state cannot be a
β-approximate PNE with β < 3 if any of them play their first strategy.
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If, on the other hand, all these players play their second strategy, players 5
and 6 incur a cost of 3 on their resources ri,j1,2 and r
i,j
2,2, respectively, independent
of which i and j they are using, since all players in {1, . . . , 4} allocate the
resources corresponding to strategy 2. Both player 5 and 6 could decrease
the cost of the resource corresponding to the first group to 1 by switching the
strategy. However, we have to take the other group into account as well.
If player 5 switches her strategy, she allocates the resource rk,l1,1 for freely
selectable k and l in {7, . . . , 10}, which yields a cost of 1 if at least two players
from {7, . . . , 10} play the second strategy. Analogously, player 6 incurs a cost of
1 on the resource corresponding to the second group if at least two players from
this group play their first strategy. One of the two cases must hold, which implies
that either player 5 or player 6 can improve her cost from 3 to 1. Hence, in every
state there is at least one player who can improve her cost by a factor of 3, and
there exists no β-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for any β < 3.
On the positive side we can show small approximation factors for small
strategy sets. Besides matroid games, we can show approximation factors which
are independent of the structure of the strategy sets, but depend on either α-
uniform players or on equal cost functions:
Theorem 10. Let Γ be a congestion game with mixed objectives. Let d =
maxi∈N,Si∈Σi |Si| be the maximal number of resources a player can allocate.
1. If Γ is a matroid congestion game, then Γ contains a d-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium.
2. If the players are α-uniform, then Γ contains a d-approximate pure Nash
equilibrium.
3. If er = ℓr for all resources r ∈ R, then Γ contains a
√
d-approximate pure
Nash equilibrium.
4. If the players are α-uniform and er = ℓr for all resources r ∈ R, then Γ
contains a β-approximate pure Nash equilibrium for β = d
α·(d−1)+1 .
Proof. 1. The proof relies on the fact that PNE always exist in player-specific
matroid congestion games [1]. We define a player-specific congestion game
Γ′ with the following cost functions: cir(S) = αi · ℓr(S) + (1− αi) · er(S).
We show that every PNE in Γ′ is a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium
in Γ. Since PNE always exist in matroid player-specific congestion games,
the claim follows. We denote by ci(S) the costs of player i in state S in
Γ, and by cpi (S) the costs in Γ
′. Let Si be a best-response strategy w. r. t.
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S−i in Γ
′. Then we get for all strategies S′i ∈ Σi:
ci(S
′
i, S−i) = αi ·
∑
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′
i, S−i) + (1− αi) ·max
r∈S′
i
er(S
′
i, S−i)
≥ αi ·
∑
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′
i, S−i) + (1− αi) ·
1
d
·
∑
r∈S′
i
er(S
′
i, S−i)
≥ 1
d
· cpi (S′i, S−i) ≥
1
d
· cpi (Si, S−i) ≥
1
d
· ci(Si, S−i)
2. We show that the function Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 (α · ℓr(i) + (1 − α) · er(i))
is a d-approximate potential function, i. e., its value decreases in every d-
improvement step. Consider a state S and a player i who improves her
costs by a factor of more than d by deviating to the strategy S′i:
Φ(S′i,S−i)−Φ(S)
=
∑
r∈R
nr(S
′)∑
i=1
(α·ℓr(i)+(1−α)·er(i))−
∑
r∈R
nr(S)∑
i=1
(α·ℓr(i)+(1−α)·er(i))
≤α·
∑
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′)+(1−α)·max
r∈S′
i
er(S
′)+(1−α)·
∑
r∈S′
i
er(S
′)−(1−α)·max
r∈S′
i
er(S
′)
−
(
α·
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S)+(1−α)·max
r∈Si
er(S)
)
≤ci(S′)−ci(S)+
∑
r∈S′i
(1−α)·er(S′)−(1−α)·max
r∈S′
i
er(S
′)
≤ci(S′)−ci(S)+(d−1)·ci(S′)<ci(S′)−d·ci(S′)+(d−1)·ci(S′)=0
3. We show that Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 ℓr(i)
2 is a
√
d-approximate potential
function. Consider a state S that is minimizing Φ and player i who de-
viates to the strategy S′i. Note that Φ(S)− Φ(S′i, S−i) =
∑
r∈S ℓr(S)
2 −∑
r∈S′ ℓr(S
′)2. Hence,
∑
r∈S ℓr(S)
2 ≤∑r∈S′ ℓr(S′)2.
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ci(S
′
i, S−i) =
∑
r∈S′
i
αi · ℓr(S′) + (1− αi)max
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′)
≥ αi ·

∑
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′)2


1
2
+ (1− αi) ·
(
max
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′)2
) 1
2
≥ αi ·
(
1√
d
·
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S)
)
+ (1 − αi) ·
(
1
d
·
(∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S)
2
)) 1
2
≥ αi√
d
·
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S) +
1− αi√
d
·max
r∈Si
ℓr(S) =
1√
d
· ci(S).
4. We argue that Φ(S) =
∑
r∈R
∑nr(S)
i=1 ℓr(i) is an approximate potential
function. If the latency and bottleneck cost functions are identical for
each resource, we use the fact that the cost of the bottleneck resource
is at least as high as the average latency cost, i. e., maxr∈Si er(S) ≥
1
|Si|
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S) ≥ 1d
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S), which implies ci(S) = α ·
∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S)+
(1 − α) · maxr∈Si ℓr(S)
≥ (α+ 1−α
d
)∑
r∈Si
ℓr(S).
Consider a state S and a player i who improves her costs by a factor of
more than β = d
α·(d−1)+1 by deviating to the strategy S
′
i.
Φ(S′i,S−i)−Φ(S)≤ci(S′)−ci(S)+
∑
r∈S′
i
(1−α)·ℓr(S′)−(1−α)·max
r∈S′i
ℓr(S
′)
≤ci(S′)−ci(S)+(1−α)·
(
1−1
d
)
·
∑
r∈S′
i
ℓr(S
′)
≤ci(S′)−ci(S)+(1−α)·
(
1−1
d
)
· ci(S
′)
α+ 1−α
d
=
(
1+
(1−α)·d−1
d
α+ 1−α
d
)
ci(S
′)−ci(S)
=
(
1+
d−1
α·(d−1)+1−1+
1
α·(d−1)+1
)
ci(S
′)−ci(S)
=
d
α·(d−1)+1ci(S
′)−ci(S)<0
We remark that the β given in the fourth case of Theorem 10 is bounded
from above by 1
α
. However, if α is close to 0, the bound of
√
d derived for general
games with ℓr = er for all resources, but without restrictions on the preference
values, may give a better approximation guarantee.
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5 Conclusions
We studied a new class of games in which players seek to minimize the sum of
latency costs, the maximum of bottleneck costs, or a combination thereof. As
a promising avenue for future work it would be interesting to consider other
types of cost aggregation. This would be useful in scenarios with heterogeneous
players with different interests in which the resources represent not only links
in a network but also servers, routers, or any network functions in general.
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